29th August 2026 – 04th September 2026
Contents
- LOCAL NEWS
- 1. Submission of Due Annual Reports and Corresponding Financial Statements - Extension
- NTERNATIONAL NEWS
- 2. Help BIMCO Shape the Future of Biofouling Management
- 3. Strait of Hormuz: Trump dismisses Iran deal leading Iran to state that the Strait will not reopen for the time being. Escalation and Transit Risks
- 4. IMO’s Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships(ISWG-GHG 22): Next Round of Net-Zero concludes with discussions still divided
- 5. EU eyes more Russia sanctions. Slovakia rejects EU’s plan to lock in Russia sanctions for 12 months
- 6. U.S. ‘Economic Outcast’ operation gains momentum as EU endorses sanctions; South Korea weighs military backing
- 7. China faces prolonged port congestions
- 8. European Commission boosts maritime manufacturing with new EU Industrial Maritime Value Chains Alliance
- 9. US TREASURY REPORT
- 10. PIRACY REPORT
LOCAL NEWS
1. Submission of Due Annual Reports and Corresponding Financial Statements - Extension
On the 4th September 2026, with respect to Companies, which on the 9th February 2026 received a Notice for filing their annual reports within a period of six months, the Department of the Registrar of Companies and Intellectual Property, announced the extension of the submission of the annual reports and the corresponding Financial Statements until the 31st December 2026. The Registrar clarified that Companies that fail to comply with this, the process of their deregistration will continue, as provided for under article 327 of the Companies Law, Cap. 113.
Related Article:
NTERNATIONAL NEWS
2. Help BIMCO Shape the Future of Biofouling Management
On the 3rd September 2026, BIMCO issued a new survey, seeking industry feedback on practical experience with the 2023 IMO Biofouling Guidelines.
The survey will gather insights on implementation, effectiveness and operational challenges, forming part of a wider BIMCO evidence-gathering initiative that also includes surveys of port agents and biofouling service providers. More specifically, the survey looks for feedback from shipowners and operators on their awareness and use of the guidelines, the effectiveness of biofouling management plans and record books, and any barriers to implementation. The survey aims help identify what is working well, what challenges remain, and where additional guidance or clarification may be beneficial.
Together, the findings will provide valuable insights into the regulatory, operational and service delivery aspects of biofouling management. The findings will support BIMCO's engagement at the IMO and help ensure that future measures are practical, proportionate, and capable of being implemented consistently across the global fleet, as IMO aims to form a new legally binding framework, targeting the future direction of international biofouling management, which is said to be likely adopted in 2029.
Please see below the links to the survey:
Introduction and Initial consent - Privacy Policy Agreement
Please note that, all surveys will close on 24 October 2026.
Related Article:
BIMCO 03/09 - Help BIMCO Shape the Future of Biofouling Management
3. Strait of Hormuz: Trump dismisses Iran deal leading Iran to state that the Strait will not reopen for the time being. Escalation and Transit Risks
Hours after Tehran called on Washington to return to the Islamabad memorandum, on Tuesday, 1st September 2026, US President Donald Trump dismissed the value of any agreement with Iran, telling Fox News that he had given Iran “a lot of chances” and said he had little faith in any agreement with Tehran.
His remarks came as President Masoud Pezeshkian said Iran would respond immediately if the United States returned to its commitments under the June agreement, reinforcing Tehran’s position that the memorandum remains the principal route back to diplomacy.
However, Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf struck a harder tone in a video message the same day, saying Iran’s policy was to secure implementation of the memorandum’s conditions. “If the United States does not fulfill its commitments, we will force it to do so through the language of power,” Ghalibaf said. He said the Strait of Hormuz would not reopen until Washington implemented its obligations under the agreement and described forcing the United States to comply, warning that Iran would respond militarily if Washington intensified its maritime blockade.
In the light of the above developments, on the 2nd September 2026, Reuters reported renewed attacks between Iran and the United State, marking the largest exchange of fire between the United States and Iran since July, with Washington striking Iran’s southern coast and Tehran firing at U.S. bases across the region. The recent incidents, raise the possibility that Iran may respond, particularly given the unpredictable nature of the conflict and the potential for further escalation.
The exchange of fire was the worst since July, when President Donald Trump abruptly halted two weeks of intense bombing of Iran. While it is considered that Trump has yet to achieve the objectives he set when launching “Operation Epic Fury” in February, U.S. officials say that American military operations have seriously degraded Iran’s conventional military forces and further weakened an already struggling Iranian economy. Against this backdrop, President Donald Trump’s administration is facing growing domestic pressure to end the war, as the conflict continues to weigh on his approval ratings ahead of the crucial November midterm elections.
As a result of the current circumstances, movement through the Strait of Hormuz remains at very low levels, with only four commodity vessels transmitting through the waterway on Thursday, 3rd September 2026. However, it is noted that the figure excludes vessels that might have crossed the strait with their Automatic Identification System transponders turned off to avoid detection. It is reported that the region remains volatile due to naval blockades, reported sea mines, and military exchanges, causing war risk insurance premiums to skyrocket.
Given the current situation and the unpredictable turns that this conflict continues to take, transit through the Strait of Hormuz remains risky and potentially dangerous for commercial shipping. The possibility of further escalation or a renewed Iranian response cannot be discounted, and vessels planning to transit the waterway should remain alert to developments and carefully assess the associated risks.
In the light of the above mentioned risks, major shipping firms and carriers, such as Japan's Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, have warned that normal transit will not resume through the end of the year, citing extreme security risks that "far exceed" acceptable levels.
As a result, oil prices were heading on Friday, 4th September 2026, for their steepest weekly gain since mid-July, as rising tension and renewed U.S.-Iran hostilities heightened concerns over Middle East supply risks.
On Thursday, 3rd September 2026, Rystad Energy chief economist Claudio Galimberti said in an energy summit in Singapore that “there is little that the United States and Iran currently agree on.” “Therefore, we expect flows to remain very low until November, as the economic costs associated with a lasting disruption continue to weigh.”
Related Articles:
Attachment 1: Reuters 04/09 - Gulf shipping traffic via Hormuz keeps below 10-day average, data shows
Attachment 2: Reuters 04/09 - US probes Iran wedding strike that analysis shows was likely direct hit by US munition
Attachment 3: Reuters 02/09 - US-Iran strikes raise fears of renewed war across the Middle East
Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remains below the 10-day average - Maaal
Trump dismisses Iran deal after Tehran pushes return to Islamabad memorandum | Iran International
How could US-Iran conflict end? Three experts give their views
4. IMO’s Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships(ISWG-GHG 22): Next Round of Net-Zero concludes with discussions still divided
The IMO’s Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships (ISWG-GHG 22) met in London from 1–4 September. IMO completed its next working group session discussing efforts to reach a decarbonization approach still largely divided, and is now aiming for a potential resolution by the end of 2026. Optimists are noticing a productive discussion however, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and primarily other oil-producing states continued their opposition to the Net Zero Framework, and key issues were deferred to more intersessional discussions or a consequential series of three sessions in late November and early December 2026. The United States and the other countries continue to push to scrap key elements of the Net Zero Framework or call for additions such as different fuels and more pathways. The proposed GCG Fund remains one element of strong opposition even with proposed changes and a renaming. Other states, like Liberia put forward yet different approaches.
During the discussions, several environmental organisations have likewise urged IMO Member States to adopt the proposed NZF without weakening its provisions. They argue that the Framework is necessary to drive the decarbonisation of international shipping and to support a just transition. In particular, the organisations have called for the retention of a financial mechanism that places a cost on greenhouse gas emissions, together with a dedicated fund to incentivise the uptake of cleaner fuels and technologies. They have also expressed concern that policies favouring LNG and other methane-based fuels could result in long-term investment in technologies associated with continued emissions. The environmental organisations have further called for the IMO’s Life Cycle GHG Assessment framework to take greater account of methane leakage, biodiversity, human rights and indirect land-use impacts when assessing the environmental performance of marine fuels.
Against this background, the positions advanced by Liberia, Japan and Brazil appear to seek amendments to the proposed NZF that would remove or reduce the requirement for direct payments linked to greenhouse gas emissions. While the proposals differ in their respective approaches, a common element is the avoidance of a direct payment mechanism by shipowners.
In contrast, the proposal submitted by Pacific IMO Member States concerning the introduction of a carbon levy covering all GHG emissions from international shipping provides for a direct economic incentive to reduce emissions while generating financial resources to support the maritime energy transition. The proposal also seeks to ensure that no countries are disproportionately affected by the adverse economic impacts of the transition, while allowing countries to benefit from the economic opportunities arising from the development of new energy technologies and related infrastructure.
Cyprus has repeatedly expressed reservations regarding the proposed financial mechanism, with further developments on this issue coming during the next session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 85), scheduled to take place from 30 November to 3 December 2026.
Related Articles:
IMO Concludes Next Round of Net-Zero Discussions Still Divided
ISWG-GHG 22: Working Group Ends With Net-Zero Framework Text Expected at MEPC 85 - Ship & Bunker
NGOs call on IMO states to ignore dangerous distractions en route to net zero | Cyprus Mail
5. EU eyes more Russia sanctions. Slovakia rejects EU’s plan to lock in Russia sanctions for 12 months
On Wednesday, 2nd September 2026, European Union foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas stated that the bloc is ramping up pressure on Russia after Berlin accused Moscow of being behind a failed drone attack on a German airport.
Kallas warned that “attempts to intimidate Europe” would fail. “We are working on new proposals to tighten sanctions enforcement and we are moving ahead with more sanctions,” Kallas said. In a post on X on Wednesday, Kallas said the bloc was preparing to sanction an additional 1,600 individuals and entities linked to Russia’s military sector and that the EU was “ready to add more”.
Kallas also highlighted broad support among the bloc’s foreign ministers for imposing a ban on former Russian military personnel from visiting the EU.
On a related note, according to Politico’s diplomatic sources, on Wednesday, 2nd September 2026, the Slovak government rejected a 12-month extension for the EU's individual sanctions package against Russia.
The measures — which have already been extended by six months many times before — expire on Sept. 15. The bloc had hoped to secure a longer extension and avoid repeated renegotiations, but any amendment requires the unanimous support of all 27 member countries.
Related Articles:
Slovakia rejects EU’s plan to lock in Russia sanctions for 12 months – POLITICO
6. U.S. ‘Economic Outcast’ operation gains momentum as EU endorses sanctions; South Korea weighs military backing
On Thursday, 3rd September 2026, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent praised the EU for signing on to “Operation Economic Outcast,” the campaign aimed at severing Tehran from the global financial system. “We appreciate their strong and early stance,” Bessent said in a social media post. “The world is sending a clear message to the Iranian regime: We will not stop until every remaining financial lifeline has been severed,” he added.
However, Euronews points out that the European Commission statement Bessent refers to, published on Monday, 31st August 2026, welcomes the US campaign without formally committing the EU to it.
The document the US Treasury Secretary cited was published on the 31st August 2026, the opening day of the meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors in Asheville, North Carolina. The US chairs the group this year, and Bessent hosted the gathering alongside Federal Reserve Chair Kevin Warsh, using it to press counterparts to cut financial ties with Tehran or risk secondary sanctions of their own.
The EU statement opens by listing the bloc's longstanding complaints, such as Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, its destabilising activities in the region and in Europe, its military support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the repression of the Iranian population. It notes that the EU "has adopted extensive sanctions to prevent Iran from exploiting the global economy and financial system" and "remains ready to take further measures, where necessary, to safeguard its security and interests, including freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz."
On the American sanctions campaign itself, the wording is carefully limited. The EU "welcomes efforts at ensuring that Iran ceases its destabilising activities and engages in peace negotiations with good faith, also through additional economic pressure, including through the US-led Operation Economic Outcast," and says it will "continue to work closely with the United States and other G7 and international partners."
Euronews emphasizes that nowhere does the statement say the EU is joining the operation, as Brussels announced no new sanctions, no alignment with US designations and no change to its own regime, which already covers Iran's nuclear and missile programmes and its support for Moscow. It also restated that it "believes continued diplomatic efforts are necessary to reach a peace settlement."
Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Esmail Baghaei, pushed back against the EU’s move to endorse what he called Washington’s “economic terrorism.” in a post on the 1st September 2026 Baghaei blasted that the bloc had “surrendered its sovereignty, its laws and regulations, values and ethics to U.S. coercion.”
Separately, South Korea is weighing options including military assistance to support the U.S. bid to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping, Reuters reported Friday, citing the presidential office.
The government, however, denied local media reports that a decision has already been made, saying “details related to the issue have yet to be decided,” in a statement to reporters, according to Yonhap News.
On Thursday, 3rd September 2026, several South Korean media outlets reported that Seoul was preparing to send troops to the Gulf region before year-end, and could seek parliamentary approval as soon as this month.
Related Articles:
EU joins U.S. sanctions push as South Korea weighs Hormuz deployment
US claims EU joined new Iran sanctions push, yet Brussels only endorsed them | Euronews
7. China faces prolonged port congestions
Congestion remains severe at Ningbo, Shenzhen, Guanghzou and Shanghai following further operational disruption caused by the Iran - US war, as well as the cascading effect of multiple typhoons in the past month, the latest being Typhoon Saudel.
The concentrated arrival of typhoons led to temporary closure or operational cuts at these ports.
Furthermore, tensions in the Middle East have led to widespread rerouting towards the Cape of Good Hope, disrupting shipping schedules.
On the 1st September 2026, Ningbo’s seven-day average vessel waiting time stood at about 3.45 days, while Shanghai’s reached approximately 5.21 days. Yard occupancy at Ningbo was between 92% and 95%. Vessel bunching, berth delays and pressure on trucking continued to affect the port. Conditions reported on the 3rd September 2026 showed longer waits at individual terminals.
According to CNC Line, Ningbo’s MSICT recorded average delays of five to six days, although vessels longer than 366 metres were waiting three to four days.
Carriers have responded by omitting affected Chinese ports and changing individual vessel schedules. However, during an update call on Tuesday, 1st September 226, Rolf Habben-Jansen, chief executive of Hapag-Lloyd, said he expects congestion to remain a feature of major ports for at least several years. If we look at the amount of disruption that we see and also the congestion that we see in a number of ports, quite a bit of that seems to be fairly structural”, Rolf Habben-Jansen stated.
Related Articles:
China faces prolonged port congestions amid typhoons, Mideast war | Hellenic Shipping News Worldwide
China port congestion forces carrier schedule chan... | myKN
8. European Commission boosts maritime manufacturing with new EU Industrial Maritime Value Chains Alliance
On the 2nd September 2026, the European Commission has officially launched the new EU Industrial Maritime Value Chains Alliance to tackle maritime sector challenges and boost competitiveness, following up on its commitment in the recently adopted European Industrial Maritime Strategy.
The alliance aims to bring together maritime manufacturers, shipowners and other downstream users, EU Member States and their regions, investors, and social partners.
Its goal is to help strengthen Europe's maritime industrial and technological sovereignty in identified lead markets, notably segments with a potential to bolster Europe's maritime manufacturing capacity. The alliance will help to create business cases for scaling up production and deployment in market segments and technologies relevant for the EU manufacturing base and address the needs of the shipping, ports, and other segments of the maritime sector. In addition, this alliance will prompt targeted investment, public-private synergies and industrial collaboration towards joint action and concrete projects, while addressing market, trade and competitiveness challenges in a more comprehensive manner.
A call for applications published today invites stakeholders to join if they comply with the eligibility criteria and commit to the objectives of the Alliance. The call will remain continuously open with a first cut-off deadline on 16 October 2026.
Related Articles:
EU Industrial Maritime Value Chains Alliance - Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs
EU launches alliance to tackle maritime sector challenges, boost competitiveness
9. US TREASURY REPORT
The US Treasury Report for all actions reported is hereby attached.
Related Article:
Attachment 4: US Treasury Report for week 29/08/2026 – 04/09/2026
10. PIRACY REPORT
The Piracy Report for all actions reported is hereby attached.
Related Article:
Attachment 5: Worldwide Threat to Shipping (WTS) Report, for the period between 05/08/2026 – 02/09/2026
Nothing important to report from ECSA, IMO, ILO and the House of Representatives.