CUS NEWS REPORT FOR WEEK 35 OF 2026

• Individuals linked to Iranian military procurement, cyber operations, petroleum and petrochemical trading, IRGC/Qods Force networks, logistics and sanctions evasion.
• Companies and intermediaries in the UAE, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, India, Turkey, Switzerland, France, the UK and other jurisdictions involved in shipping, oil trading, logistics, technology procurement and financial facilitation.
• Shipping companies, ship managers, charterers and vessel-owning companies connected with Iranian petroleum movements or IRISL-related activity.
• Vessels, particularly crude oil and LPG tankers, identified as part of Iran-related oil and shipping networks.
• Financial institutions and payment intermediaries facilitating significant transactions for designated persons or sanctioned Iranian sectors.
• Maritime service providers, including insurers, reinsurers, brokers, agents, bunker suppliers, port service providers and other parties servicing vessels trading with or transiting in connection with Iran.
• Non-U.S. persons, who may also face secondary sanctions exposure even where there is no direct U.S. nexus.

The main criteria triggering sanctions exposure are:

1. Operating in or providing material support to newly designated Iranian sectors under E.O. 13902, namely: (1) Shipping, (2) Aviation, (3) Technology, (4) Digital assets and (5) Gold.
2. Conducting significant transactions with designated or blocked persons, including entities owned 50% or more, directly or indirectly, by blocked persons.
3. Facilitating Iranian petroleum or petrochemical trade, including transportation, brokering, financing, logistics, chartering or other services connected with Iranian crude or petroleum products.
4. Supporting the IRGC, IRGC-QF, MODAFL, IRISL or other sanctioned Iranian government bodies, directly or indirectly.
5. Participating in sanctions evasion or money-laundering arrangements, including use of front companies, intermediaries, digital assets or shadow-fleet structures.
6. Providing goods, technology or logistical support for Iran’s missile, nuclear, military or proliferation-related programmes.
7. Providing services connected with sanctioned Strait of Hormuz arrangements, including payments, guarantees, insurance or cooperation with the designated PGSA, PGMIC or Hormuz Safe entities.
8. Causing a U.S. person, U.S. financial institution, insurer or reinsurer to violate U.S. sanctions, even indirectly.

For CUS members, the most important practical point is that the exposure now extends well beyond the listed SDNs themselves. Shipowners, managers and charterers should assess counterparties, beneficial ownership, cargo interests, chartering chains, payment flows, insurers, brokers, port agents and any Iran-related voyage activity, particularly where Iranian oil, the Strait of Hormuz or the newly sanctioned shipping sector is involved.

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OFAC 24/08 - Iran-related Designations; Updates to Iran-related General Licenses

• BIMCO: EU/UK-Russia and US-Iran sanctions: must-watch webinar

Amid the sanctions recently issued by OFAC, BIMCO has prepared a webinar examining the latest EU and UK sanctions against Russia, as well as the renewed US focus on Iran. The webinar will discuss what has changed, where the key pressure points are, and why these developments are important for everyone involved in maritime trade.

For a deeper understanding of sanctions and their implications for the shipping industry, BIMCO also invites all relevant stakeholders to participate in its Sanctions in Shipping Training course, which will take place on 2 and 3 September 2026. Those interested in attending can register through the relevant link.

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BIMCO 25/08 - EU/UK-Russia and US-Iran sanctions: must-watch webinar

Due to the ongoing conflict, following the hijacking of the SEAMULL on 20 August 2026, more than 90 seafarers are currently held captive and roughly 20,000 sailors remain stranded on ships in the Persian Gulf.

On 24 August 2026, IMO Secretary-General Mr. Arsenio Dominguez called for the immediate and unconditional release of all the seafarers who are held captive. Mr. Dominguez pointed out that “shipping challenges are on the rise with the recent increase of piracy incidents in the Gulf of Aden. With the most recent highjack, a sixth vessel is being held by pirates and armed robbers in waters that are becoming too dangerous for seafarers”. The IMO Secretary General emphasized that the deteriorating maritime security situation in the region requires urgent attention and that the resurgence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden must not be left unaddressed, as the safety and security of seafarers must remain a global priority.

According to Mr. Dominguez, these recent incidents highlight the responsibility of flag and coastal States to ensure that ships under their jurisdiction are adequately prepared to manage security risks and that crews are not exposed to avoidable dangers. In this regard, ships and companies should implement industry best management practices for maritime security (BMP Maritime Security) and comply with relevant IMO guidance, including MSC.1/Circ.1601/Rev.2.

Mr. Dominguez reiterated that the IMO will continue to support regional efforts led by coastal States to address the resurgence of piracy through initiatives such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct and its Jeddah Amendment. Furthermore, he stated that the IMO will continue to work closely with governments and other stakeholders to strengthen cooperation, enhance maritime security, and ensure the safety and protection of seafarers.

On a positive note, on the 28^th August 2026 the US Central Command (CENTCOM) declared that internationally recognised transit routes in the Strait of Hormuz are free of Iranian sea mines. “The US military has achieved a major milestone in the Strait of Hormuz. We have successfully cleared sea mines in the Strait’s international shipping lanes that were laid months ago by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),” CENTCOM Commander Brad Cooper said in a video update posted on X. However, industry security officials remain sceptical, citing ongoing military warnings about mine threats and survey operations.

Against this backdrop, mediators have renewed efforts to secure the reopening of the Strait and restore normal maritime traffic. Iran has agreed to prepare a list of conditions for reopening the waterway following a request from mediators, including a Qatari emissary who urged Tehran to respect freedom of navigation. The Prime Minister of Qatar also met with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on 27 August 2026 and stressed the importance of restoring the pre-war situation and ensuring the free movement of vessels through the international waterway. Iranian officials have also indicated that ending the regional conflict would be among the conditions for reopening the Strait. On the same note, Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, stated that in regards to the list of conditions requested by mediators, for reopening the waterway, Iran has reached an understanding with Oman on a proposed shipping corridor through the Strait, with parts of the route passing through Omani and Iranian waters. According to Rezaei, vessels could use a designated central channel if the United States agrees to Iran’s conditions.

These developments follow reports on 26 August 2026 that Iran and Oman were continuing discussions on the details of an arrangement concerning the waterway. This came after Iran’s Revolutionary Guards stated that the two countries had agreed on how control of the Strait and its revenues would be shared. However, a Guards spokesperson reiterated that Iran would not allow the Strait to fully reopen unless Washington lifted what Tehran describes as a blockade of Iranian ports, provided compensation, and removed sanctions. Iranian security chief Mohsen Rezaei has said that Tehran is drafting a list of conditions to open the Strait of Hormuz in response to mediator requests, adding that the US must first take practical steps to fulfil these demands before the waterway reopens. At the same time, the United States has maintained that no negotiations are currently taking place. Washington has indicated that discussions will remain suspended until the U.S. President considers that Iran is prepared to engage in meaningful negotiations. This difference in positions continues to make a swift resolution uncertain.

Overall, while diplomatic efforts by Qatar, Oman and other mediators are continuing, significant differences remain between Iran and the United States. Until these conditions are addressed and an agreement is reached, vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is likely to remain restricted, creating continued uncertainty for international shipping and maritime trade.

Related Articles:

Attachment 1: Reuters 28/08 - Shipping traffic via Strait of Hormuz slips below 10-day average, data shows

Attachment 2: Reuters 27/08 - Shipping traffic through Strait of Hormuz rises slightly, data shows

Attachment 3: Reuters 27/08 - Iran war mediators focus on reopening Strait of Hormuz

Attachment 4: Reuters 27/08 - Iran sets conditions for reopening Strait of Hormuz, top security official Rezaei says

Attachment 5: Reuters 27/08 - Qatar steps in to mediate as Trump says US not talking to Iran

IMO 24/08 - IMO calls for urgent action as piracy resumes in the Gulf of Aden

Iran war live: Tehran prepares conditions to open Strait of Hormuz | Donald Trump News | Al Jazeera

Riviera - News Content Hub - 'Major milestone': US CENTCOM says it cleared sea mines in the Strait of Hormuz

"That sucker is open": U.S. gains the upper hand in the battle for Hormuz

US clears Strait of Hormuz shipping lanes, CENTCOM says | The Jerusalem Post

The rejection comes as Turkey continues to encourage both sides to agree to a moratorium on attacks in the region. Ankara has warned that earlier concerns about the conflict spreading to commercial shipping routes are increasingly becoming a reality. At the same time, Russia has acknowledged the economic impact of Ukrainian drone attacks, including strikes on oil refineries deep inside Russian territory. However, President Vladimir Putin stated that Moscow had rejected ceasefire proposals from Kyiv, describing them as “unacceptable”. The continued disagreement between the two sides is adding to uncertainty for commercial shipping operating in the region.

Following the failure to reach a truce, the 48 hours to August 28 are the clearest run of the economic war between Russian and Ukraine yet. Ukraine has mostly been focusing on the oil sector in Russia and aiming to cut off supplies to Crimea, while the Russian Ministry of Defense is targeting port infrastructure and vessels in or near Ukraine’s ports, asserting all of them are carrying military supplies and equipment for Ukraine’s armed forces.

On the 25^th August 2026, Russia’s Defence Ministry said that its forces had struck cargo vessels carrying supplies for the Ukrainian military and a tanker at the Black Sea port of Pivdennyi.

Furthermore, Ukraine’s main port of Odesa has seen repeated attacks by drones and the missiles that have shut the port down and chocked off Ukraine’s grain exports. The port was under attack for more than seven hours on 27 August 2026. A grain elevator and port infrastructure were damaged and three men were injured, the head of the regional military administration, Oleh Kiper, said. Infrastructure attacks have been crippling both countries' ports since June and now feeds directly into the food price shock building in the Black Sea grain trade.

On the other hand, Ukraine’s strategy focuses both on the oil exports and the refineries across the country. Bloomberg reports oil exports over the prior four weeks have fallen to just under 3.5 million barrels per day.

Ukraine also appeared to be targeting Russia’s Black Sea grain exports. Last week there were reports that five bulkers near Novorossiysk were hit. The media has said that the grain terminals in Novorossiysk were closed and that Russia was only getting exports out through the smaller facility at Tuapse.

The ongoing attacks are also raising concerns for global agricultural trade, particularly as the region enters the current harvest season. Russia and Ukraine together account for more than a quarter of global wheat exports, while Ukraine’s Greater Odesa ports handle around 90% of the country’s grain shipments. However, exports have been significantly reduced. According to Agriculture Minister Taras Vysotskyi, Ukraine exported around 500,000 tonnes of grain during the first half of August, approximately one-fifth of its potential export capacity. Disruptions have also affected Russian grain exports. Earlier this month, three of Russia’s largest grain terminals at the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk suspended operations after sustaining damage. Russia’s Agriculture Ministry is therefore considering alternative export routes to help reduce the impact of the disruptions.

For the shipping industry, the rejection of the proposed truce means that security risks and operational disruptions are likely to continue. Shipowners and operators may also face higher costs and continued uncertainty when planning voyages, accessing ports and transporting cargo through the Black Sea.

Related Article:

SAFETY4SEA 25/08 - Russia reportedly rejects Ukrainian Black Sea truce proposal

Attachment 6: Reuters 24/08 - Zelenskiy says Russia is 'not ready' for ceasefire on grain ships

Attachment 7: Reuters 27/08 - Up to 70 ships queue off Danube as bottlenecks slow Ukraine grain exports

bne IntelliNews - Missile War Monitor: Russia and Ukraine strip out each other's delivery networks

Oil and Grain Exports Plummet as Ukraine and Russia Attack Shipping

Russia reportedly strikes five vessels in Black Sea ports - SAFETY4SEA

The revised requirements as presently notified are:

(a) Explicit prior loading permission — permission must be obtained from the PO, MMD Kolkata before commencement of loading of the subject cargoes;

(b) Explicit departure / sailing permission — separate permission from the PO must be obtained prior to departure;

(c) Port risk assessment — a Risk Assessment is to be carried out by the port and submitted to the PO for any liquefiable cargo;

(d) Shipper’s declaration — to be submitted as per MS Notice 2 of 2017;

(e) Mandatory surveyor attendance at each stage — surveyor attendance now operates as a gate on the loading operation itself;

(f) Declaration of the full path (chain of custody) of the cargo — the Owners / Agents / Shippers are to submit a document detailing the full path of the Group A cargo up to sailing of the vessel.

The position is evolving, since the authority has indicated this is an initial requirement and that detailed procedures are being drafted.

London P&I advises its Members and Assureds to ensure that they comply with the IMSBC Code and local requirements.

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The law firm Holland & Knight provided detailed information on required on submissions from “member[s] of the trade community who consider conducting transportation on a foreign-flag vessel between two US ports”. Waiver requests submitted to MARAD and the US Department of War must include:

• name (including IMO Number) and flag of the vessel
• name of the owner and operator of the vessel (and country)
• name of the carrier
• dates of the voyage
• any relevant ports of call and applicable dates, including place of lading, port of lading, date of lading, place of unlading, port of unlading and date of unlading
• description of the cargo carried, including commodity and relevant HTS code and hazmat code, if applicable, and quantity of the units to be shipped per shipment
• frequency of the shipment
• explanation as to why the voyage is in the interest of national defense.
• Any other information the Maritime Administrator determines necessary

According to Intermodal’s weekly market report, the temporary waiver of the US Jones Act is reshaping coastal tanker flows and creating new opportunities for international tonnage, as rising domestic energy movements expose gaps in the coastwise fleet.

The latest waiver provides some relief to foreign flagged vessels, while preserving priority for eligible tonnage, also allows international vessels to meet part of the demand. This activates previously latent transportation demand, as cargoes that may have been uneconomic or difficult to move under the Jones Act can now be served by foreign tonnage.

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What is required for a Jones Act waiver request